How do economists observe the world? For colleagues in the economics department, the question is almost automatically transformed into another with a seemingly easier answer: What are economic observations? "My statistical data, of course."
1. For references to literature in the history and philosophy of observation, we refer to this volume. References in this introduction are limited to literature cited.
to serve as inputs for models and the testing ground for theories, and so these measurements came to be considered the "observations" economists work with. It is only comparatively recently that economists have generated their own observations through controlled experiments, yet retain that sense of outputs despite the attention to the process involved. Such observations tend to remain attached to their site of scientific observation and so not obviously freely available to the profession at large. Both genres of observations, the senior statistical and junior experimental, fit well with the mid-twentieth-century emphasis in the philosophy of science on observational statements, rather than on the process of observing, just as they fit contemporary economists' emphasis on measurement, quantification, and testing.
When questioned historically, these tenets in economics and philosophy of science lose their self-evidence. In Representing and Intervening, Ian Hacking (1983, 167) argued that much of twentieth-century phi losophy of science was premised on two "philosophical fashions" that distorted our views on observation. The first was what Willard Quine called semantic assent: focus the analysis on observational statements rather than on observing as a process and as a practice. The second was turning experiment active and observing passive, well expressed by the nineteenth-century physiologist Claude Bernard, who degraded the observer into an "untrained and unprejudiced assistant" whose only work was to "patiently record nature's answers verbatim." As shown in detail in Histories of Scientific Observation, the outcome of an interdisciplinary project at the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science in Berlin, early modern philosophers had theorized observation as the "fusion of perception, judgment, memory, and reason," but for Bernard, "The observer no longer reasons; he registers" (quoted in Daston and Lunbeck 2011, 4) . 1 Turning the observer into a passive registering device left little of interest in the notion of observation for philosophers in the logical empiricist tradition over and above what could be expressed linguistically and preferably in "protocol sentences." Debates on the observability of theoretical concepts or the theory-ladenness of observational statements, spurred by Norwood Russell Hanson's and Thomas Kuhn's groundbreaking works, focused on the contributions of theory to observation, not on the process of 2. For a recent overview and critical discussion of this literature, see Radder 2006. observing as actively enriching scientific knowledge.
2 So philosophers of science tended and still tend to see observing, even when loaded with theory, as the mere registration of and reporting on facts in the world. The debate in the 1950s between Milton Friedman and Paul Samuelson on the status of modeling assumptions and the virtues and vices of operationalism in economics equally effectively confined the interest of economists and methodologists to the observability of the economist's theoretical constructs, understood in terms of their measurements and predictive values.
Yet observation "suggestively ambiguously" keeps the middle between process and result, as Lorraine Daston and Elizabeth Lunbeck (2011, 7) write. By insisting on the ambiguous seat of observation between doings and outcomes, this volume traces a history of sites, practices, and techniques of observing that shaped-and still shape-the economics discipline.
Observing Economic Observers: A Casual Historical Tour
From a historical point of view, the idea that the observations made by political economists can be identified with quantified data outcomes is less than obvious. Rather the opposite, in fact. It is well known, for instance, that Adam Smith and other classical economists were highly critical of the work of so-called political arithmeticians, or "statists." In contrast, reference was made to the "common sense" of mankind as a source for observation in preference to the "false statistics" of political arithmeticians. Most famous perhaps are Adam Smith's observations on the workings of the pin factory (probably taken from secondary sources such as the French Encyclopédie) that informed his analysis of the division of labor. Perhaps equally famous is Smith's paradoxical comparison between the wealth of an African prince and an ordinary workman in Scotland, which can be traced to correspondence of John Locke with the administration in the Carolinas on the social and economic conditions of the indigenous Americans (Maas 2011) .
In the nineteenth century, observations were made at different sites and reported in different formats, ranging from the writer's desk to the settings of parliamentary committees, and from official reports to novels. In the nineteenth century, references to "evidence" in British parliamentary reports (on agriculture, monetary reform, etc.) were not to the numerical tables included in appendixes but to reports and examination of eyewitnesses. The observations of Thomas Carlyle in Past and Present, of Henry Mayhew in London Labour and London Poor, and the fictional narratives of Elizabeth Gaskell, Charles Dickens, Honoré de Balzac, Émile Zola, and many other novelists functioned in public debate on a par with the observations of political economists. At the turn of the twentieth century, the massive investigation into the behavior of "trusts," monopolies and cartels in the United States, both included the observations of economists and provided observational resources for them. Governmental inquiries, particularly at the state level, offered a wealth of observational details about the behavior of railroads, the conditions of labor, housing, and so forth. American economists were well known to be both contributors to these exercises and users of them.
The tools and instruments of the economists also varied widely. In that same late nineteenth and early twentieth-century period, we find Ernest Engel, triggered by Frédéric Le Play's studies in household budgets, investigating the cost of living of Belgium working-class families (Hacking 1987 (Hacking , 1990 ) and the French engineer and economist Émile Cheysson investigating family budgets using Le Play's method of monographs (Desrosières 1986) . At the beginning of the twentieth century John R. Commons instructed and employed his students in the famous Pittsburgh Survey of 1907 (Rutherford 2011) , and the Men and Religion Forward Movement transformed the self-image of America by embarking on a series of local social and economic surveys to advocate the Social Gospel, gathering observations that were to be significant for American institutionalism (Bateman 2001) .
Observations were made at home and on the move. Turgot wrote his posthumously published "Lettres sur le commerce des grain" traveling through the French province of the Limousin during the famine of 1770 (Rothschild 2001, 74) . The marquis de Condorcet's Réflexions sur le commerce des blés appeared in the same year as Smith's Wealth of Nations and was heavily informed by his conversations with his friend Turgot on the Limousin experience. In the interwar period Ronald Coase made historical studies on gas, water, and electricity supply in Britain before journeying to America where he visited, among others, large-scale production plants of Union Carbide in Cleveland and Ford Motor Company in Detroit, plants that vastly surpassed any scale he knew of. These informed his foundational paper on the nature of the firm in the 1930s, in which he 3. We would like to thank Steve Medema for providing information on this episode. questioned the validity of established theories (Coase 1988) . Reading Joan Robinson's papers on imperfect competition of the same period, he was curious to find out if her theory was the result of introspection or firsthand observations, and he wrote to her-so the story goes-asking about which firms she had visited in developing her theory. 3 Problems at the desk could also prompt economists to leave the office to make firsthand observations. Because of the difficulties economists such as Phyllis Deane and Wolfgang Stolper experienced in forcing statistical data from colonial and postcolonial Africa in the mold of Richard Stone's system of national accounts, they traveled there to observe and ask local inhabitants about their economic ways of doing (Morgan 2011) . Even today, members of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England travel through the country to listen and learn "firsthand" of economic conditions in Britain, while the Federal Reserve Board retains local governors in its process of policymaking as a way to discover local economic variations.
Economists also use casual modes of observation, although not all economists warm up to such "armchair observations" (Gibbard and Varian 1978; Simon and Bartel 1986) . The Nobel laureate Robert Lucas wrote that his "earlier papers" on business cycles were concerned with "coffeebreak facts" that he obtained "second-hand," or "common knowledge around Chicago and Carnegie Mellon" (Boumans 2005, 92) . Others refer to personal experiences at airports (Sutton 2000) as the kind of observation that needs to be explained by their models.
However and wherever made, observations were never simply reported; it was a process of combining and thinking in which personal experiences mixed with other sources. After the Great War, John Maynard Keynes left the delegacy of the British Treasury in a burst of outrage to pen his observations on and frustrations with the Versailles peace treaty negotiations in his best-selling Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919) . Keynes proceeded synthetically, as a novelist constructing a plot. He combined his intimate experience of the "micro-cosmos" of Versailles with observations taken from a wide variety of sources into a magisterial epic that spanned the past "economic Utopia" abruptly ended by the war, the present peace treaty negotiations, and their grim future prospects. This melding of personal experiences with his wide reading in history and political economy and intimate knowledge of British state finances created his vision on the economic consequences of the treaty and fit his view of the business of economists as inherently "introspective" and "moral" (Maas 2011; see also Skidelsky 2004) .
In a similar vein Paul Krugman wrote in The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008, an extension of his earlier book on the Asian crisis, that his "spine chilled" when crisis struck Asia at the end of the 1990s, and it "should have . . . anyone with a sense of history." For him, the world no longer needed economists who used the "scaffolding" of "equations and diagrams" to construct an "intellectual edifice" but economists who constructed a "narrative," a "story line," connecting such disparate events as "what Prime Minister Mahathir said in Kuala Lumpur in August 1997 and relates it to what Donald Tsang ended up doing in Hong Kong a year later" (Krugman 2009, 4-7) . Thus, Krugman suggested, the tools, instruments, and strategies of observing that Keynes had used to great effect in earlier days should replace the modeling strategies of contemporary economists. But as argued in the present volume, the models Krugman takes distance from may serve to flesh out narratives that first make things visible.
This short and nonsystematic journey through the history of economics shows that observations of things economic were made in the confines of the private study, while traveling as a government delegate or on private journeys, at official sites for hearings by select committees, at research departments, think tanks, and policy institutes, as well as in conversations with friends and colleagues. Observations were made by political economists in person or came to them second-or thirdhand. They were reported in many different formats, in book-length tracts and histories, in sermons, narratives, letters, and pamphlets, in secret and public minutes, reports, and documents. Nowadays, they are reported in statistical and accounting reports, graphical representations, editorial comments, blogs, tweets, and newspaper columns, testimonies of experts to parliamentary committees, model simulations produced in research departments of central banks and economic research laboratories, country studies of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and in papers and articles on field or laboratory experiments. They appear in economic forecasts, "now-casts," and "stress-tests" that all, one way or another, report "observations" on the economy that are used by economists for theorizing, by governments and business to prepare economic interventions, and by the general public to brace itself for a default of countries or banks that will have consequences for social security and pension payments. All these 4. See, for example, Alač 2004 and Pasveer 1989. different modes of reporting things observed reflected, and reflect, a process of different connected steps that defy the idea of simple representations or measurements.
Observing, Registering, and Thinking
Our examples of observation certainly did not and do not all have the format of quantified statistical evidence, and even if they do, this does not mean they naturally follow the laws of probability. As Theodore Porter (1994 Porter ( , 2011 points out, quantified (statistical) data are better considered a particular kind of observation. Quantification in economics does not always imply the locating of means and variances, but may follow the classificatory grid of national accounting, the peculiarities of an exemplary case study, or the disciplined recording of observations in the field. These methods may not be highlighted by the economics profession in its public utterances, but they are well-established research methods, each with a logic that does not reduce to statistics and yet often found hidden in the base of statistical evidence used by economists (as we see in some of the essays in this volume). Contemporary discussions about the importance of "real-time data" for modeling and policy purposes, and the renewed interest in questionnaires and field research, show the economist's awareness both that there is a gap between the recorded measurement and what the measurement intends to express, and that such measurements do not capture all that may be observable.
So, in many fields nowadays, we find a reverse process, in which quantitative measurement is a stepping-stone in constructing an observation rather than observations leading to quantitative measurements. For example, both a supernova explosion and an fMRI-scan showing that emotions are involved in choice behavior depend on complex computations transgressing disciplinary boundaries before anything can be seen, and both what can be computed and what is seen involve trajectories of learning and socialization for the scientist. 4 The many different technical elements and the human processes of explicit and tacit knowledge acquisition that lie behind the observation offered in a GNP figure are just as daunting to unpack, not least because they, too, transgress disciplinary boundaries.
Our historical examples also show how far we have been led astray by the idea that observing is a mere registering of "facts." To make observations is far from passive, but involves the hard work of scientists, individually and as a collective. It involves thinking and conjecturing, tools and instruments, and the acquisition of skills. It is no coincidence that economic tracts of the seventeenth and eighteenth century-perhaps the heyday of observations as a genre of writing-interchangeably had Observations and Reflections in their titles, bearing witness to the close connection in the educated mind between observing and thinking. 5 Although sometimes concerned with the special and the peculiar, observations of economic phenomena were often made in a process that stretched over time and was a collective effort, as in William Petty's massive Down Survey, in which he enlisted one thousand soldiers to chart Ireland so that the English government could meet the land demands of claimants who had financed the bloody suppression of Ireland's rebellion of 1641. The survey provided Petty with a wealth of observations he used for his comparative studies into the causes of richness of the Dutch and the Irish (Aspromourgos 1996; Petty and Larcom 1851). One can find equally timeconsuming and large-scale comparisons in the collection of information on the state (the original meaning of statistics) made in the cameralist tradition (Nikolow 2001; Tribe 1988) .
Even a paradoxical observation such as that of Smith on an African prince and a common workman in Scotland was premised on a previous history of observing. And even after observing became associated with numbers, it remained an open question at what point such observations were made. Did Phyllis Deane start observing when she sat down to look at data from the Colonial Office at her desk in London, or when she realized that those data did not fit the classifications of Stone's accounting grid, or did she observe only once she was in Africa using Stone's accounting system as a measuring rod, or when she gave up on the possibility of making a coherent set of national accounts for Rhodesia (see Morgan 2011; Speich 2008 Speich , 2011 ? As that case, and those in this volume attest, there are just as many not quite closed links that take the economist from raw observations to final ones in such a process as Bruno Latour (1999, 58) found in his account of how information about soil quality traveled from Latin America to Paris via a "long chain of translations" involving scientists, institutions, and instruments that needed to be developed and put to work.
Once we realize that there is more to observation (the noun) in economics than statistics, and more to observing (the verb) than the passive registration of given facts, we find a rich history of both in economics. The purpose of the present volume is to uncover enough elements of that history to broaden our understanding of how economists observe the world and so change the way historians, philosophers, and economists think about this basic activity of science.
Histories of Scientific Observation
The following collection of essays results from the annual HOPE conference held April 16-18, 2011, at Duke University. This conference, which was funded by Duke University Press and the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research, would not have been possible without the earlier participation of the two guest editors in the project on histories of scientific observation of the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science in Berlin. As can be witnessed from this introduction, we are heavily indebted to this project, which extended over four years. Before we talk in more detail about the present volume, we would like to highlight two outcomes of the Berlin project that have particular relevance for our history here.
The first pertains to the word observation itself that, as said, ambiguously refers to a process and a result. As a process, observing was from ancient times not so much related to what, following Ernst Mach, became almost emblematic, an impression of the senses, but to the notion of observance-the careful and repeated following of rules closely associated with religious practices. The astronomical observations of monks obeyed standards of "goodness" captured in disciplined behavior performed not just on an individual basis but in fact over different generations and geographic spheres. Although individuals could be "good" or "bad" observers, it was not so much the individual acumen that was valued, because those individual capacities tended to vanish behind the rules observed. New astronomical observations built on and added to the fund of astronomical observations collected over centuries (Park 2011 ). Much has changed since then, but regimentation of the observer has become more rather than less important.
The second issue pertains to observation-as a process and in outcomes-as a collective endeavor. When physicians in the early modern period began to write observationes on their patients, these observations were collected and collated in compendia that trained the individual physician in turn to recognize specific diseases to which he could add observations from his own patient histories (Pomata 2010 (Pomata , 2011 ; on the notion of historia, see Pomata and Siraisi 2005) . Natural historians formed corresponding networks, of which that of Carolus Linnaeus perhaps is the most famous, in which observations (with or without the specimen observed) circulated with extensive descriptions and drawings of the place where the specimen was found (Bleichmar 2011; Müller-Wille 2003; Roberts 2009 ).
Collective observation posed questions about the reliability of the individual observer, whether in the past or in the present, and so helped create criteria of "goodness" of observations. But the rapidly increasing number of observations posed challenges to technologies of compression and synthesizing as well, to which standardized questionnaires, schemata, maps, taxonomies, tables, but also folded paper or clever clips to facilitate counting, became answers (Mendelsohn 2011; Didier, this volume) . These tools and instruments in their turn created objects that themselves became the subject of observation, such as a world map of the tides or the winds, the Carte du ciel map of the heavens (Daston 1994) , cadastral maps showing patterns in tithe payments (Snyder 2011) and in farming and pasturage (D'Onofrio 2010), an agricultural map of the United States (Didier, this volume), or tables of national income accounts of UN countries. These objects could not possibly have been observed by isolated single observers but depended on a host of single observers as well as teams and institutes. Such tables and maps were and still are the result of large-scale observing operations that could extend over decades and involved a great many devoted observers with different skills and qualities (Daston 2011b) .
Such operations never were a neutral endeavor but were intimately related to the power of states and enterprises (Aubin, Bigg, and Sibum 2010; Daston 2011a; Scott 1999) . Dutch businessmen resisting the establishment of a national bureau of statistics in the early twentieth century were perfectly aware of what Alain Desrosières (1998) analyzed so thoroughly, that the numerical was political (see also Klep, van Maarseveen, and Stam huis 2006; Tooze 2001) . Think again of Petty's Down Survey, the cameralists' statistical observations, geodetic and mining expeditions in nineteenth-century Russia (Barnett, this volume; Gordin 2004) , the expeditions of the Dutch Republic's East India Company that combined commercial and scientific interests (Cook 2007) , or the cadastral maps that served taxing purposes (D'Onofrio 2010). Francis Bacon's "Merchants of Light" sailed the seas as spies to supply "knowledge of affairs . . . and especially of the sciences, arts, manufactures, and inventions of all the world"-as Daston (2011a, 88) notes, a "neat and prescient conflation of diplomatic, mercantile, and scientific models of early modern collective observation" that are still with us today.
Dimensions of the Observation Process
The essays in the volume that resulted from the Berlin project span the dizzying time line from the early Middle Ages until after the Second World War and cover disciplines ranging from astronomy via natural history, medicine, and chemistry, to economics and psychoanalysis. The present volume is much more modest in scope, not just in its limitation to one discipline-economics-but also in terms of the time frame covered. With two essays stretching the time line back into the eighteenth and forward to the last decade of the twentieth century, most essays concentrate on the first half of the previous century, which, not incidentally, is the period in which economics became a well-established academic discipline with increasingly stabilized methods of research, but which was also the period that saw the bureaucratic collection of data starting on scales that vastly surpassed the "avalanche of numbers" of the early nineteenth century (Hacking 1990) .
We have organized the essays under three themes or dimensions of the observation process that emerged as the most salient from our conference: (1) articulating the space of observation; (2) questions of trust; (3) the configuring role of instruments. These three themes suggest how histories of scientific observation might be expanded with special attention to the social sciences.
Articulating the Space of Observation
How to define the space of observation is by no means obvious. "Articulation"-as used by Latour (1999) -usefully points to the mediating steps that are involved in creating not only the observed but also the observer. It moves away from notions of representation that-one way or anotherpresuppose that the object to be observed is "out there" and simply waiting for tools and a language that a skilled scientist will use to report what it is. Scholarship in the history of statistics has repeatedly pointed out how 6. On the concept of mediation, see also Morrison and Morgan 1999. administrative categories work to create the thing observed (e.g. , Hacking 1990; Porter 1986 Porter , 1994 Power 1999) . Emmanuel Didier introduces in his essay the fiction of a "plasma"-a messy, opaque field of actors and information within which a statistician starts looking for information and distilling numbers. Didier's fiction helps trace the mediating steps that transformed widely heterogeneous observations into a connected numerical image of rural America. 6 It helps in rethinking the problem of numbering the social, but of course numbers and cunning ways to contrive them have been associated with states and commerce from ancient times.
Articulating a space of observation is rule and tool bound, as well as perspectivally determined by the direction and focus of the gaze (Morgan 2011) . It is a thoroughly contingent process, depending on found possibilities and constraints, such as existing institutional settings that can be fruitfully mobilized for another purpose, the ingenuity and credibility of the actors involved not only on the side of the investigators but also on the side of the investigated. Actors on both sides-the observer and the observedwill have different interests and purposes. It is more likely than not that the purposes with which, for example, an agricultural survey was started were multiple and change en route. The US Department of Agriculture not only intended to fight speculation but also wanted to gain better knowledge of the composition and total agricultural production in America. As Barnett (this volume) shows us, in surveys of Russian zemstvo statisticians, the different goals of assessing the value of landholdings for tax and data collection to improve rural living conditions coexisted. It would therefore be a shortcut to think of the resulting statistics as a representation of something "out there." What becomes the space of observation is rather something that emerges in the process and depends on the mixtures of different goals.
Possibilities to mobilize networks may be crucial for success or failure, or even for producing a result in the first place (Charles and Théré, this volume). To counter criticism that physiocratic concepts were void of content, François Quesnay and his collaborator Etienne Marivetz tried to gather empirical support by setting up an informational network outside the existing institutional framework of the French administration. But their laundry list of questions that the marquis de Mirabeau included in his Ami des hommes (1758) as a sort of "manual for the countrymen" received not one single answer, partly because of its inordinate length and complexity but also because of its unclear provenance and purposes. Was this list made by state functionaries? Was it for taxing? It needed more of a physical effort to collect data than to send out a questionnaire with an unclear status from Quesnay's premises at the court of Versailles. Just like Didier's statisticians used the existing grid of highways and byways in rural America to situate themselves in the midst of their object of inquiry, so the efforts of the physiocrats to mold rural France in the grid of their concepts became more effective when mobilizing existing social networks or when they traveled the province themselves armed with Quesnay's guidelines for making observations.
Equally contingent in any particular science's history of observational practice are questions about the relevant units of observation. In the history of economics, searching for typologies or for statistical laws, writing monographs or collecting family budgets, were all as important as taking surveys. But the choice of these was not self-evident. Scale mattered, as did ethnographic differences that themselves were constructed, but no less real. Standardization of questionnaires was not the obvious answer in countries such as the United States, Italy, or Russia, where socioeconomic conditions were so visibly different that it did not even seem feasible to think of different parts of the same country as part of the same economy. In the Russian case, seeing differences in complex wholes seemed a more viable way to proceed than smoothing them out, and the choice of Russian economists and statisticians for Le Play's method of monographs seemed a better fit to produce reliable and useful knowledge of the country than random sampling, producing distributions with random meaning. Gathering and collating numbers do not necessarily end in statistical distributions governed by the laws of probability, but may for good reasons lead to classifications that highlight the typical and serve as norms. This sometimes, as Barnett notes, had devastating consequences, as in the case of the statistical category of the kulaks, which an administration gone wild decided to physically exterminate.
The Fragile Dynamics of Trust
If there is a relevant difference between the natural and the social sciences, it is situated in the interaction of the observer and the observed. The four contributions that we collect under this label given to us by Federico D'Onofrio's contribution all show how statistical institutes, economists, and psychologists struggled with the issue that the making of social observations is an inherently collaborative effort between the observer and the observed. The social observer is better thought of as a broker trying to compromise between different interests than someone fitting the image of the detached observer of the natural world. Friedrich Engels's Condition of the Working Class in Britain (1844) relied heavily on the evidence given to parliamentary committees on child labor and factory conditions. But Engels relied no less on a source of information that middle-class enthusiasts for statistics in Lancashire found too close for comfort, namely, the firstperson access that his Irish girlfriend gave him to the slums of Little Ireland in Manchester. This may be the most far-reaching way to bring a frightening world indoors and into the ambit of the observer, but no social observation is possible without some sort of participation of the observed in the process. This holds as much in economics as in any of the other social sciences, and there may be good reasons to consider this issue of wider significance, as most saliently in the study of primates.
Observers had to invent ways to gain access to their primary sources of information. In D'Onofrio's study, those inquiring into the conditions of Sicilian peasants appeared with a "panoply of revolvers and rifles," perhaps to enforce honesty on those observed who preferred to keep their affairs hidden or lie about them, perhaps out of mere self-defense. They observed largely illiterate farmers who talked in dialects the observers did not understand but who, in fact, possessed the expert knowledge the observers eagerly sought. In Thomas Stapleford's study we find the bureaucrats at the US Bureau of Labor Statistics struggling with different formats to enlist their respondents-initially housewives-so that those observed would provide trustworthy answers to questionnaires. The bureau's strategy zoomed in first on the communicative character and skills of the interviewer, thence to questions of standardization of questionnaires, and finally to the construction of a composite respondent. These strategies of course lead to very different outcomes with very different meanings, but all, at root, had to deal with how economists, as investigators, imprint categories on their subject and how the subject contributes productively to their creation, as well as how investigators prevent subjects from determining their own categories of observation while still ensuring their collaboration. Preestablished categories and classifications make sense only if the observer succeeds in co-opting the observed into them. If illiterate Italian farmers, American housewives, or any public at large refuses to recognize a social scientist's category as relevant, the social scientist must devise new categories or must look for different things to 7. We also think this situation is different from Latour's notion that the object of study actively contributes to its scientific articulation. Whatever the commonalities are between the natural and the social, a difference (which may go back to Wilhelm Dilthey if not to Giambattista Vico) is that in the social sciences, the self-understanding of the subject plays a part. Human individuals can protest against being labeled in such and such way, and they do. The consequences of this simple point for the stability of "evidence" are, in our view, substantially underrated, at least in economics.
observe. Ian Hacking's (1992) notion of the "self-vindication" of laboratory research is more fragile outside the laboratory-in the field and in the social realm-where the thing and the concept are coproduced and depend on the consent of subjects. 7 The implication of this is that social statistics and classifications are always the outcome of strategic interactions that are politically loaded. Acknowledging, and even highlighting, this strategic nature means that social observations are normally made in a "hostile environment"-not in the sense of needing a weapon to protect oneself but in the scientific sense of an environment of people and places that are radically uncontrolled, ever changing, and not to be trusted. One of the problems Oskar Morgenstern saw was that social science observations were not made by scientists and so necessarily fell short of standards of scientific accuracy-they were the product of ignorance, falsehood, or deliberate fraud. Another problem was the unique and dynamic nature of economic phenomena themselves. Morgenstern sought for the solution neither in an engagement or dialogue with the social realm, nor in washing out errors by treating them all as part of a probability distribution, but in attempting to characterize, and so tame the "error" in, those unruly and untrustworthy observations through "scientific observers" who would rely heavily on theory in their expert judgments (Boumans, this volume) . Despite these differences, Morgenstern's strategy parallels an older one found in other scientific domains (Swijtink 1987) , namely, an uncertainty measured is an uncertainty tamed and no longer so threatening. Morgenstern's strategies for accurate observation show us the processes of detachment from their subject matter that social scientists came to practice across many domains in the midtwentieth century as they fought to establish their credibility as scientists (see also Renwick 2011) .
Thus, during the twentieth century, the economist became a consumer of data sets for modeling purposes in the space of his or her office. He or she might be concerned about the quality of the data, just as we are concerned about the quality of our food in a restaurant, but would stay out of the kitchen and concentrate on theory. Observation being made passive, trust became invested in the rigor of mathematical theory, statistical models, and the promises of the computer (Weintraub 2002; Morgan 2003 Morgan , 2012b .
The idea that theory could fill the gap between the economist and his or her data became increasingly problematic in the later twentieth century. It is indicative that when economics turned to experiments in these last decades, discussions around the formation of a new society of economists did not center on the experiment as a defining characteristic but on the perceived failure of the econometric project as a nonexperimental science and the felt need for economists to take responsibility again for their own data production. What became the Economic Science Association was not limited to experimental economists but embraced all economists who considered economics an observational science. Reflecting on the famous "measurement without theory debate" between Tjalling Koopmans and Jacob Viner just after the Second World War about the appropriate road forward in economics, the experimental economist Vernon Smith argued that the promises of the 1950s had remained unfulfilled and had, in fact, turned into "theory without measurement." As Smith, who won a Nobel Prize for his pioneering work in experimental economics, expressed the mission of this new society in a luncheon address in 1986 that became foundational: "The battle is not for experimentalism. The battle is for a way of thinking that emphasizes the integrity and primacy of observation" (quoted in Svorencik 2011) .
Those who in the 1950s had challenged the high hopes of economists had a hard time finding a sympathetic hearing. Thus when George Katona, the Gestalt psychologist, turned to consumer research during the Second World War, he questioned the possibility of extracting causal mechanisms from statistical data sets (Edwards, this volume). Statistical data, he argued, did not express a mute mechanism the economist could guess at; rather, individuals (and populations) could take different lines of action on a given statistics, depending on their understanding of the social complex. As a consequence, economists could not use statistics to build economic models that somewhat mechanically would pour out predictions. In contrast, they should engage in a game of trust; they should engage with their subject pool-the public-and policymakers to flesh out a shared understanding of the economy in relation to possible lines of action. Statistics did not predict but should be seen as an "announcer" awaiting interpretation.
For economists who had just found a possible way out of their lack of control by utilizing econometrics, the computer, and theoretical models, such a program was just too vague and far off the scientific standards that were propagated by logical empiricism to fit what by then was becoming an established symmetry between explanation and prediction in econometric modeling. For such economists, like James Tobin, Katona's project of surveys of intentions seemed to fit ill with both the observations on consumption that they already had on hand and the various theoretical elements (theories of inflation, of household consumption, of life cycles, etc.) through which they made sense of those observations and tested their theories.
The Configuring Role of Instruments
It has become a convention in the recent history of science to see instruments as critical partners in scientific knowledge production. Instruments of observation are no longer seen as "mere registering devices" but complex objects embodying scientific knowledge in their construction that matters to their use and interpretation of the observations they produce. Instruments reconfigure vision. That is, instruments configure the relation of the observer to the observed and to observations in very different ways. Whether these instruments remain black-boxed or their workings are revealed for the reader, they are largely conceived of as physical and so understood as part of the material culture of science. In the social and human sciences, such instruments may well be human, and this is especially true in the processes of observing. The empathy of the psychoanalyst is perhaps the most well-studied of such human instruments (see Lunbeck 2011 ), but the ways in which the scientist as human acts as its own instrument of scientific observation has also been discussed in the history of field sciences such as ecology and geology. Such experiential observation links both methodologically and historically with how social scientists work in the field, as in the social/human science ethnographies of anthropology (see Kuklick and Kohler 1996) . Here, in Malcolm Rutherford's essay, we see how economists too have followed this ethnographic path as a way of getting close enough to their subjects in order to observe firsthand through participant observation in their activities. There is an inevitable trade-off-between the observer going undercover to observe the subject in a way that keeps the observed person and group honest, and getting so involved with those subjects that detached, objective observation on the part of the economist-observer is compromised. That trade-off varies with the degree of engagement: as the economist becomes more of the detached observer, his or her observations may become less fruitful, and the observees may become less willing to share their experiences.
Many instruments of observation in science in more recent times have been designed to observe and record the observations simultaneously. The moves from early and simple telescopes and microscopes to the modern generations of these instruments are good examples of this tendency (Schickore 2007) . We find the same shared characteristic of observing and recording in the laboratory and computer-based experiments of economics, but equally in a much older instrument in economics although operating in a much wider public place, namely, in narrative writings. Craufurd Goodwin's essay takes up two different examples of this. First, Frank Norris's own participant observation and journalistic investigations parallel much of the experiential observing of the economists discussed by Rutherford. Norris embeds his own economic observations into fictional narratives about the American economy of that same period. This fictional shell allows Norris to repeat that eighteenth-century writer's trick that we noted earlier of both recording his observations and reflecting on them, implicitly judging them, at the same time.
In contrast, and in a way that forms a neat link to the final essay in the volume, Goodwin investigates how E. M. Forster uses his narrative observations on the economic characteristics and events that beset the different classes in early twentieth-century England to probe the economic understandings of this same world offered by his contemporary economists. He uses his narrative to observe the economists as much as to observe the economy. Narrative fiction, conceived as an instrument that brings observation into the public gaze, has a tremendous ability to reveal both detail and the wider picture, to make descriptions along with judgments, and to communicate both in a way that has no pretense to science but that lays strong claim to the closely associated modes of observing and reporting found in the humanities such as anthropology and history.
While it might seem odd to pair fictional narratives with econometric models, both, by this account, offer instruments that synthesize observation of the economy with ways to understand the economy. The notion that econometrics is a mode of observation (Hoover 1994) and that econometric models are instruments that enable economists to find their ways to economic observations that are hidden in raw data numbers (Boumans 2005 ) may still be an unusual way to think of econometrics, but is well established in the historical and philosophical writings on that subfield of economics. The econometric model operates as an instrument that both turns raw data into numeric relations and works to seek out hidden numbers. It is not so much an observation and recording device but an observation and revealing device rather like the modern fMRI scans, which produce sophisticated versions of the traditional X-rays. Yet, as Pedro Duarte and Kevin Hoover explain, models can flip between functioning as the device that shows the random elements as background noise while keeping the economic observations in the foreground to the reverse, showing the random elements as data or important evidence about phenomena. The history of random elements in modern macroeconomics, from the early work of Ragnar Frisch in which they played a theoretical role as innovations but were not directly observable to the recent central place as observable entities, either as data or as phenomena, is characteristic of the changing relationships between modeling and observing in twentiethcentury economics.
Like other instruments and modes of observing, modeling invites both trust and distrust. The models of the economist are artificial constructions. They may be reliable instruments of observation, but as all such instruments, they have to be proved so by testing their performance in the field. A similar trust-distrust relation, with a testing-out process between observer and observed, occurs in the undercover fieldwork of the institutionalist economists. For the latter, those trust-distrust issues reside in the personal relationships that form the heart of participant observation, rather than in the technical relations between models and observations in econometrics (see Morgan 2012a for a broader discussion of the participant observation problem). Each observing setup has to be tried and tested, even where the basic rules and constraints of such a mode of observation are well understood by the observers.
Observing the Economy
The essays collected in this volume allow us to regain sight of practices of observation that had seemed lost in the identification of observations with statistics. Taking the double meaning of observation as a process and as a result as the key to unlock that history has revealed practices of observation that are far richer than merely purchasing time-series data sets over the Internet for modeling purposes. Through much of the earlier history, the economist was not just a passive consumer of data found elsewhere but actively contributed to their making. In doing so, he or she was not only observing a world found "out there" but actively constructing that world to be subsequently theorized. We have seen this creation of the space of observation in contributions that all, interestingly, related to one of the major concerns of political economists over the centuries: grain and agriculture. But it is easy to see the message of these essays extended to other domains, most obviously to national accounting and so to macroeconomics and macroeconomic policy (Morgan 2011; Comim 2001; Speich 2011) , and to the field of (international) finance that recently has come under close and stimulating scrutiny by economic sociologists such as Donald MacKenzie and Michel Callon. These scholars prefer to think of the relation of the economist to the world in terms of performativity, that is, as a one-way movement from theory to the world. Our contributions give evidence that coproduction may be the better way to think about this relation.
The coproduction of observational knowledge is not unique to economics. What we do think unique to the social sciences, including economics, is that coproduction depends on a form of collaboration with the subject of study that can be distinguished from that in the natural scienceseven though this may be a gradual rather than categorical difference. In the social realm, subjects can actively disagree with typologies, classifications, and measurements that are proposed by the economist, and act on their disagreement to change them. This turns any observation, including measurements, in the social realm into a dialogue between observer and observed. If traders on the Chicago mercantile exchange had not found the small charts of trading prices Fisher Black distributed (for pay) on the trading floor useful, they would not have bought into the categories of option price theory. There are interests on both sides of the observation process in ways different from the natural sciences, and this makes observing the social a dialogue, or a game of strategy, in which the observed may seek to hide or misreport its own activities while the observer seeks to see behind the superficial or the reported elements.
These interactions, in which interests on both sides may be hidden from view, almost disappeared in much of the twentieth-century project in which economists became not passive recording devices but passive as consumers while active as manipulators rather than coproducers. For the health of economics, it is reassuring that, at present, economists show a renewed interest in methods of research that were long scorned by the profession. The reemergence of field research, questionnaires, and sur-veys, as well as the explosion of experimental research in economics and the new foray into field trials, shows observational practices are changing rapidly. This is not just a return to forlorn practices, and old-methods-innew-jackets are not without their problems, but it does mean that economists are becoming aware, again, of the multifarious ways in which they can explore their subject. That they do so consciously is all for the better, because behind their backs, as witnessed by the essays in this collection, these other methods shaped-and shape-the data the economist took as "given." Thus the present volume may serve as a reminder and an encouragement to rethink what it means to observe the economy, as a practice and in its results.
Part 1 The Space of Observation

